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Abstract— We consider the problem of Fair Resource
Sharing to optimize the performance of resource sharing
in peer to peer systems. Resource sharing systems currently
face rational peers which may exhibit a variety of strategies
including : no participation, also referred as free-riding, and
greedy behavior. The first aspect has been extensively stu-
died in the late years, while the second one has not received
much attention. The broad class of proposed solutions focus
on designing incentives to reward cooperative peers. The
side effect of these incentives is twofold : the system load
is not balanced and the resource potential of the system is
not fully exploited. The P2P fair resource sharing aims at
both balancing the load and maximizing the use of system
resources.
The contribution of our work is twofold. First, we specify
the P2P Fair Resource Sharing problem and propose a
mechanism to solve it in large scale dynamic networks
with rational users. Our mechanism is composed of a novel
incentive (i.e. fair cooperation) and an algorithmic part
encapsulated in a middleware layer. Second, we propose
an architecture for our mechanism middleware layer inclu-
ding four distributed services that bring together several
research area : aggregation, semantic group membership
and tracking. Finally, we implement our mechanism using
a peer-to-peer unstructured model and evaluate it through
simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
In peer-to-peer (P2P) systems resources are highly
distributed and stored by individual peers. In such en-
vironments where each peer may present a different
self-interested entity, designing algorithms for sharing
resources becomes a difficult task. Traditional distributed
algorithms design faces only two types of behaviors :
obedient (i.e. to follow the algorithm) or malicious (i.e.
to “play” against the others). In contrast, in P2P systems
users may have a strategic behavior which may be neither
obedient nor malicious, just rational. It was established in
[1] for example that in the absence of incentives a large
fraction of peers have a priori no motivation to share
while they are naturally incited to use system resources.
The effects of “free-riding” (consuming resources wi-
thout contributing) was extensively studied in the last
years [1], [13]. This behavior can cause severe degrada-
tion of the system performances or even may lead to the
system collapse [14]. As emphasized by Shneidman and
al. [14], different approaches may be adopted to face
rationality : i) to ignore it and to expect that system
will do its best despite self-interested peers, ii) to limit
the effect that a rational peer can have on the system
by using trusted mechanisms, or iii) to adopt the fault
tolerance techniques. However, none of these approaches
benefits from resources that may be potentially offered
by these rational and self-interested peers. Thus the
system must motivate each peer to behave rationally in
a system efficient way. Solutions come from economics
and more precisely from the mechanism design theory
that always stressed for algorithms that work correctly
in the presence of predictable selfish behavior.
In this work we address the Fair Resource Sharing
problem. Essentially, this problem aims at optimizing
the resource sharing in P2P systems where peers exhibit
rational behavior. The mechanism we propose to solve
this problem comprises a fair differential service incen-
tive for motivating peers to cooperate and an algorithmic
ingredient encapsulated into a distributed middleware
layer. The incentive ingredient eventually harnesses the
resources of all the peers by motivating free-riders to
change their strategy (peers that contribute more get
better quality of services) while encouraging greedy
peers to share their requests with less solicited ones.
The middleware layer is composed of four services :
i) The Registration service, which is used by each new
peer to advertise the system of its resource potential ;
ii) the Semantic Group Membership service, which self-
organizes peers into semantics clusters to maximize a
fair distribution of requests among peers having similar
resources but dissimilar popularity ; iii) the Tracking
service whose role is to track free-riders within a given
semantic group, and iv), the Aggregation service which
combines the actions of each peer to evaluate his beha-
vioral functions. All these services, bringing together for
the first time distinct research areas (i.e. semantic group
membership, aggregation and tracking) are distributed
and implemented using peer-to-peer tools. The enginee-
ring novelty of our mechanism design is twofold. First,
services are implemented within a middleware layer,
limiting the impact of malicious peers, and second, the
modular conception of our mechanism, that abstracts the
incentives from the services needed to implement these
incentives can be further exploited in the design of a
generic middleware for incentives implementation in P2P
systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II discusses some related work. In Section III we
present the system model and the specification of the
Fair Resource Sharing problem. Section IV presents
the fair cooperation mechanism. Section V presents the
architecture of fair cooperation mechanism middleware
layer. Simulation results are presented in Section VI.
Section VII concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
A broad class of differential service incentives have
been recently studied in order to convey the free-riding
problem in P2P resource sharing [8], [2], [5]. A first at-
tempt to formally prove the efficiency of such differentia-
tion mechanisms, using a game theoretic framework, has
been proposed by Buragohain et al. [6]. Their model has
then been revisited and enriched by Feldman et al. [8]
in order to study the free riding and the whitewashing
problems (peers that change their identities in order to
escape from the consequences of their past). The latter
takes into account the generosity levels of the users.
They then evaluate the efficiency of a penalty mechanism
under these settings. These models, however make impli-
citly the assumption that each peer scrupulously follows
the specification of these mechanisms and, especially,
report truthfully their own contribution. Ngan et al.
[10] propose an auditing mechanism based on top of a
Chord overlay to ensure that peer report truthfully their
real contribution. In our work, we don’t expect nodes
to report their own contribution but, instead, consider
the near past interactions of nodes and evaluate their
contribution through this. Banerjee et al. [4] consider a
reciprocation strategy and use expected utility, based also
on past interactions, as a decision function. However,
the collection and maintenance of the history of the past
interactions between peers is not precised.
A very close work to ours is that of Triantafillou et
al. [11], [12]. Their system is build on top of a DHT
overlay. The key idea of their solution is that each time
a peer accesses a resource shared by another one, the
former owes the latter a favor. Each peer then redirects
the requests for the same resource to those from which
he has get favors. These favors are also used to compute
the generosity level of the peers and to differentiate the
service in proportion with the generosity of each node.
However, their work lacks a clear formulation of the
fairness problem.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM SPECIFICATION
A. Communication Model
We assume a large finite, yet unbounded dynamic set
of users, also referred to as peers. The set is dynamic
in the sense that peers can join or leave at any arbitrary
time.That is, peers can leave or join the system arbitrarily
often, and they can fail temporarily (transient faults)
or permanently (crash failures). Each peer is associated
with an unique identifier. Peers can communicate with
each other over a network providing a best-effort da-
tagram service, similar to the Internet. In other words,
most messages are delivered unless either the sender
or receiver fails beforehand. Yet, neither the message
delivery nor ordered delivery of messages is guaranteed.
B. P2P Resource Sharing Model
We assume that each peer in the system owns a
set of resources declared as shared within the system.
A resource is characterized by a type and a quantity
available at some time t. Peers ask shared resources
via request messages. A request message includes the
requester identifier, the type and the quantity of the
resource. We say that a peer matches a request if it owns
a resource matching the type of the requested resource.
A peer satisfies a request if it matches the request and
if it provides this resource to the requester or forward
it to a less demanded peer. Note that, even when the
necessary quantity of resource is only partly available
on a given peer, any request that matches this resource
is taken into account.
Each peer in a resource sharing system gains a certain
benefit b from using the system and pays a certain cost
c participating to it. More precisely, b(p, r(t), t) is the
benefit that peer p gains for each remote resource r(t)
used at time t 1, and c(p, r) represents the cost induced to
p for each unit of its accessed resource of type r. These
two parameters have a strong influence on the utility of
a peer, that is the benefit derived from its interaction
with the other peers in the system. This utility depends
on two additional parameters : The participation level of
a peer p, part(p, r, t), which represents the quantity of
resource of type r ∈ R that p has offered to the system
until time t. The access level of p, al(p, t), which is the
fraction of resource of the system that p has access at
1p connects at time t = 0.
time t. Formally, the utility u(p, t) of peer p at time t is
defined as :
u(p, t) =
Z t
t′=0
b(p, r(t′), t′)al(p, t′)−
X
r∈R
c(p, r) ∗ part(p, r, t).
(1)
C. Peers Behavior
A peer-to-peer resource sharing system is made of
autonomous, rational and strategic peers that interact
among each others. These peers are rational because they
wish to maximize their utility (by accessing limited but
sharable resources), and they are strategic because they
can choose the actions that minimize their participation
(free-riding strategy) or maximize their access level
(greedy strategy). Both strategies have dramatic conse-
quences on the system welfare. An emergent property
of a resource sharing system where nodes are neither
free-riders nor greedy is fairness.
D. P2P Fair Resource Sharing Problem
Formally, the fair resource sharing problem is charac-
terized by the following properties :
Requests Sovereignty Eventually, any request sent by
a non-free rider is satisfied if the requested resource is
available in the system.
Peer Sovereignty Any peer is allowed to request a
resource infinitely often.
Peer Fairness If a request is sent infinitely often then it
is received infinitely often by any peer that matches it.
Peer Cooperation If a non-free rider peer receives
infinitely often a matching request then he satisfies it
infinitely often.
IV. PRINCIPLES OF OUR SOLUTION
To motivate players to cooperate in a fair resource
sharing system, we propose to extend the classical dif-
ferential service incentive model to the fair differential
service incentive.
A first attempt in designing differential service incen-
tive mechanism is the following : to gain full access
to the system resources, a peer has to provide a fixed
proportion of its own resources, otherwise he obtains
only a small fraction of these resources. Courcoubetis et
al. [3] have shown that this fixed fee-based mechanism is
sufficient to ensure a social welfare in large scale social
networks, however it is adapted to the so-called one shot
games only. That is, games in which each peer chooses
an action to take (for instance, to provide a resource
or not), once for all. In our context, a peer may decide
to unilaterally switch his strategy in the course of the
game if this improves his utility. An example of such
behavior is the whitewashing phenomenon [7] characte-
rized by the fact that free-riders repeatedly masquerade
as newcomers by obtaining new identities at low or no
cost prior to each request. Clearly, whitewashing enables
a peer to escape the consequences of his past. Hence,
the cooperation incentive has to adapt to these changes.
That is, the system should be able to detect such strategy
changes and act accordingly.
The differential service incentive basically increases
the access level of a peer according to the participation
level. However an adequate relationship between these
two parameters is important since by imposing a too high
restriction on the access level peers may be discouraged
to join the system, while relaxed participation fees would
encourage free riding. The side effect of this mechanism
is to encourage selfishness by tempting peers to increase
their participation level in order to increase their access
level. Clearly, this may considerably augment the po-
pularity of some peers at the expense of unpopular or
newcomers peers that will be bound to remain isolated
because requests are preferably sent to popular peers.
To circumvent this islanding process, we extend the
differential service mechanism with fairness incentives.
Essentially, this mechanism motivates peers to forward
some of the received requests to less solicited peers whe-
never he considers that his current level of participation
is high enough with respect to his neighbors.
The fair differential service incentive we propose,
referred in the following as fair cooperation incentive,
aims at ensuring that whenever a peer behaves as re-
quired (formally defined below) then he may access all
the resources he wishes in the system, while whenever
a peer changes his strategy, his access level is modified
accordingly. To ensure such properties, the behavior of a
peer is evaluated when he joins the system, and each time
its suspicion level reaches an upper bound susp_max,
that is, each time a peer is detected as free-rider. As
will be described later on in the implementation part,
this evaluation consists in sending several requests in the
raw to the tested peer, and to compute his access level
according to his behavior upon receipt of these requests.
Senders of these requests are chosen within the semantic
neighborhood of the tested peer which guarantees that
the requests they send match the profile of the tested
peer. Neither the tested peer nor the testers are aware of
the fact that a test is running. This is socially beneficial
and prevents free-riders from changing their strategy
during the test period. Peers keep their access level until
the next test (if any). Clearly, this is a good argument to
motivate peers to quickly change their strategy whenever
they realize that their access level have dropped. More
precisely, let al0 be the initial access level of peer p
when it enters the system, R be the number of matching
requests r sent to the evaluated peer p, and part(p,r,R)
be p participation level during the test, then the access
level of p at time t, al(p, t), is given by the following
equation :
al(p, t) =

al0 + (1− al0) 2∗part(p,r,R)−RR if part(p,r,R)6= 0,
 otherwise.
(2)
Then, if p accepts the R matching requets, that is
part(p, r, R) = R his access level will increase to
1. Similarly, if he rejects all his incoming requests
part(p, r, R) = 0, this will be set to .
Recall, that another problem faced by the resource
sharing systems is whitewashing. In networks where
identity is free, peers may change their identity over time
to escape the consequence of their past by disconnecting
and reconnecting. To prevent such behavior, an entry
fee has to be imposed to newcomers. Thus, peers have
no incentive to change their identity since they would
have to pass this entry fee at each reconnection. This
is the reason why, the access level of each newcomer
is initialized to al0. The value of al0 is set by the
system designer, and has to be low enough to avoid
whitewashing but sufficient high to not discourage peers
to participate to the network. This value is set to al0 =
1
2
2
. The access level of a free rider drops to a positive
value  to incentivize him to remain in the network, and
eventually, change his strategy.
We now describe the strategies that increase peers
utility :
Cooperative Strategy. The strategy adopted by a peer
upon receipt of a matching request consists in satisfying
the request according to the requester strategy and his
participation level with respect to his neighborhood. This
leads to the following acceptance rule :
Rule 1 (ν-request acceptance) Let r ∈ R be an
available resource at peer q at time t. Upon receipt
a matching request for r sent by peer p, q satisfies
it with probability fq(p, t) if ∀s ∈ Nq, part(q, r, t) −
part(s, r, t) ≤ ν, where ν is an application dependent
constant.
By setting fq(p, t) = al(p, t), each peer has access to
a fraction al(p, t) of the system resources.
Fair Strategy. The strategy adopted by the recipient of
a request that considers himself as busy enough consists
2Friedman et al [9], use a periodic-based model. If, after each period,
there is a fraction α of identity changes (turnover rate), for high number
of peers, and with a low probability of messages loss, the entry fee has
to be set to 1
(1−α)(2−α)
, if the turnover rate satisfies α ≤ 3−
√
(5)
2
,
otherwise, whitewashing problem cannot be solved. Here we choose
the best case where the whitewashing probability is close to 0.
in sharing his load with one of his neighbors. This leads
to the following fairness rule :
Rule 2 (ν-forwarding rule) Upon receipt of a mat-
ching request at time t, peer p forwards it to peer
q ∈ Np if part(p, r, t)−part(q, r, t) ≥ ν, where ν is an
application dependent constant.
This rule decreases the charge imposed on the cur-
rently too solicited peers by allowing newcomers or
unpopular peers to benefit from it.
We can now precisely define a fair cooperative peer :
Definition : A peer p is a fair cooperative peer if, upon
receipt of a matching request, p executes either Rule 1
or Rule 2.
Our incentive mechanism is characterized by the fol-
lowing properties 3 :
– Cooperative Peers Rewarding Property : Even-
tually, the expected access level of a fair cooperative
peer equals 1.
– Non-Cooperative Peers Discrimination Pro-
perty : Eventually, the exptected access level of
a non-cooperative peer equals .
– Fairness Property : Eventually, the participation
level of any two fair cooperative neighbors are δ
apart, where δ is some fixed constant.
Thus, a free-rider refers to a non fair cooperative peer.
Hence, we extend the classical notion of free-riding to
non cooperation and greedy behavior.
V. ARCHITECTURE TO IMPLEMENT FAIR RESOURCE
SHARING INCENTIVES
In this section we propose an architecture that im-
plements our fair cooperative incentive mechanism. The
architecture is built on top of a supervising overlay.
Members of this overlay, Supervisors, are trusted players
whose role is to verify/test the "good behavior" of each
peer. Supervisors self-organize to form an overlay that
“cover” all the peers of the system (see Figure 1). The
choice of the trusted peers and their organization is not
the focus of the current work.
This supervision overlay is the back-bone of the
following distributed services (Figure 2) :
The Registration Service assigns to each resource a
supervisor.
The Semantic Group Membership Service self-organizes
peers owning similar resources. Each group includes a
supervisor.
3The two first properties depict the service-differentiating nature
of our system. According to the rationality principle which is the
main assumption on the behavior of the users, non-cooperative peers,
eventually, either change their strategy to a cooperative one or at worst
disconnect from the network.
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Fig. 1: Middleware Overview.
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Fig. 2: Middleware Architecture.
The Cooperation Tracking Service monitors peer coope-
ration level.
The Aggregation Service combines information related
to peers participation and their access levels.
A. Orchestrating the Services to Fair Cooperation
In this section, we provide a generic orchestrating pro-
tocol for implementing the fair cooperation mechanism
(the two Rules described in Section IV). The pseudo-
code of this protocol partially appears in Figure 3.
When a site p enters the system, it first invokes the
initiate-join method with the list of resources
it owns and it wishes to share with the system. This
function first registers p and provides for each resource
p owns, the supervisor in charge of it. Note that if the
newcomer p is a supervisor, then the list of resources
he is in charge of is forwarded to his application. Then,
for each local resource r at p, this function instantiates
a semantic group object and settles a semantic group of
similar sites q (that is, the list of sites that locally own
resource r) using the semantic group primitive Join.
This neighborhood list is forwarded to the application.
Note that the neighborhood list is continuously updated.
Then an aggregate and a tracking objects are instantiated.
Once registered, sites can ask for resources by a call
to send-request with the type of resource they wish
to get4, and the recipient of the request. The recipient is
the one to which the request is sent unless another site
is under test, in which case it is privileged to receive the
request. This makes the incentive test transparent to both
the tested site (a tested site, upon receipt of a request,
cannot distinguish whether the received request is part of
a test period or not) and the testing sites (the sites, chosen
4Note that for readability reasons, the attributes of the requested
resources are omitted.
Upon send-request(r,pn) from application do
idreq := idreq + 1 ;
timer :=T0 ;
if (∃p such that testedpr.type=TRUE) then
pn := p ; (* p is priviledged as recipient of the request*)
send (Request,idreq,r,myId) msg to pn
while (TRUE) do
wait until (response or fwrd is received) or timeout
if receive (Fwd,idreq,r,pj ) msg from pn then
aggregater.type.GetPart(idreq,pj ,pn,partj ,partn)
if (partn − partj ≤ ν) then
aggregationr.type.GetAcc(idreq,myId,prob) ;
trackingr.type.IndStatus(idreq,pn,FALSE,prob) ;
deliver (RESPONSE,r,⊥,pn) to application ;
return ;
else
trackingr.type.IndStatus(idreq,pn,TRUE,⊥) ;
aggregationr.type.CompPart(idreq,pn) ;
timer:= T0 ;
pn := pj ;
exit from wait until loop
else
if receive (Response,idreq,res) msg from pn then
trackingr.type.IndStatus(idreq,pn,TRUE,⊥) ;
aggregationr.type.CompPart(idreq,pn) ;
deliver (RESPONSE,r,res,pn) to application ;
return ;
else (* timeout *)
aggregationr.type.GetAcc(idreq,myId,prob) ;
trackingr.type.IndStatus(idreq,pn,FALSE,prob) ;
deliver (RESPONSE,r,⊥,pn) to application ;
return ;
Upon receiving (Request,idreq,r,s) msg from pj do
frwd = nil ;
aggregater.type.GetPart(idreq,fwrd,myId,⊥,⊥) ;
if (frwd 6= nil) then
send (Fwd,idreq,r,fwrd) msg to pj ;
send (Request,idreq,r,s) msg to fwrd ;
else
if (Matching(r)) then
deliver (REQUEST,idreq,r,pj ) to application ;
else
(*find some random peer p in neighborhood*)
fwrd :=groupr.type.GetPeer() ;
send (Fwd,idreq,r,fwrd) msg to pj ;
send (Request,idreq,r,s) msg to fwrd ;
return ;
Fig. 3: Interaction Between the Application and the
Incentive Middleware
by the supervisor to send a request to the tested site, are
not burden with additional testing requests). Once the
request has been sent, the requester site p waits until
the request is satisfied or a timer times out. In the latter
case, p provides a non participation indication to the
tracking service. Note that this indication is accepted by
the tracking service with a probability equal to p’s access
level. This decreases the weight of non-cooperative sites.
In the former case, if p receives the requested resource
then both the participation and the suspicion levels of
the recipient q are updated accordingly. The resource
is forwarded to the application. Finally, if p receives a
forwarding indication, p checks whether this forwarding
is well-founded or not by calling the aggregation service.
In the event of an affirmative, the forwarding is rewarded
as such by increasing q’s participation level and decrea-
sing q’s suspicion level. In the other case, q’s suspicion
level is increased because q was not allow to forward
the request (i.e., the ν-forwarding rule did not apply). As
previously, the scope of this indication depends on the
access level of p. The application layer of the requester
is informed that the recipient did not act correctly. This
ends the request transaction.
B. The services in Detail
In the following we provide for each service the
interface it exports, and their implementation. Note that
for space reasons, trivial implementations are omitted.
1) Registration Service: By invoking this service with
the list of his resources, a peer obtains the set of
supervisors in charge of them. The interface exported
by this module consists in the following method :
Join(in RESOURCE res_list, out (PeerId,RESOURCE) sup_res)
Indicate that the invoking peer wishes to get his supervisors.
The sup_res output parameter contains a list of tuples (sup,res)
for each res in res_list list. An unique supervisor is
associated to a given resource.
2) Semantic Group Service: The system self-
organizes into semantic groups. This service guarantees
fairness participation for any peer by i) allowing peers
sharing the same interests to group together in order to
augment the requests successful rate, ii) homogenizing
the requests flow (in P2P, some peers are “attractive”
than others which contradicts the symmetry principles
of these systems), and iii) enabling new peers to shortly
participate to augment their level of participation (ini-
tially, peers have no reputation which does not motivate
other peers to deal with them).
The interface exported by this module consists of the
following methods :
Group(in RESOURCE res,in PeerId sup)
Constructor that instantiates the module
Join(out NEIGHBORHOOD mb)
Indicate that the invoking peer wishes to join
the semantic group.
The mb output parameter contains the membership
of the group.
UPCALL NewView(in RESOURCE res,in PeerId p)
A new view has to be disseminated.
The Semantic Group Module Implementation is as fol-
lows :
Local variables :
members - the membership list of the group
supervisor - the supervisor of the group
resourceType - the type of the group
SemanticGroup : :Group(r,sup){
Initializes variables members and supervisor ;
Allocates memory for the members data structure ;}
Upon Join(membership) from application do
members :={myId} ;
send (MB,resourceType,members) message to supervisor ;
wait until (VIEW,res,memb) msg is received from supervisor ;
members:=memb ;
return ;
Upon receipt of (MB,res,newmember) msg from the network do
members :=members ∪ newmember ;
send (VIEW,res,members) to members ;
return ;
Upon receipt of (VIEW,res,memb) msg from supervisor do
members:=memb ;
invoke NewView(res,memb) ;
return ;
3) Aggregation Service: This module computes the
access level and the participation level of a peer as
defined Section III-B.
Aggregation(in RESOURCE r,in PeerId s,in NEIGHBORHOOD mb)
Constructor that instantiates the module
NewView(in NEIGHBORHOOD mb)
Update of the membership list is needed
CompPart(in INT #,in PeerId peer)
The invoking peer indicates that peer has satisfied a request
GetPart(in INT #,PeerId p,PeerId q,INT part1,INT part2)
The invoking peer wants to know the participation level of peers p and q
CompAcc(in INT #,in PeerId peer,out LONG prob)
GetAcc(in INT #,in PeerId p,out LONG prob)
The invoking peer wants to know the access level of p
The Aggregation Module Implementation is as follows :
Local variables :
supervisor - the supervisor in charge of the aggregation module update
resourceType - the type of the resource associated to supervisor
members - the list of members involved in this module
access - the access level list containing the access level value of each
peer involved in this module
part - the participation level list containing the participation level
value of each peer involved in this module
Aggregation : :Aggregation(r,s,mb){
Initializes all the supervisor, resourceType, and members variables ;
Allocates memory for the access and participation data structures }
Upon GetPart(idreq,fd,fr,s1, s2) from application do
send a (GetPART,idreq,myId,fd,fr,s1, s2) message to supervisor ;
wait until receipt (PART,idreq,p1, p2, val1, val2) from supervisor
fd :=p1 ;fr :=p2 ;s1 := val1 ;s2 := val2 ;
return ;
Upon receiving a (GetPART,idreq,myId,fd,fr,sfd,sfr) message
from pi do
if (fd=nil) then
search in the part list the peer p with the minimum participation
level partp
if (partp < partfr) then
send (PART,idreq,p,fr,partp,partfr) message to pi ;
else
send (PART,idreq,nil,fr,⊥,⊥) message to pi ;
else
send (PART,idreq,fd,fr,partfd,partfr) message to pi ;
return ;
Upon CompPart(idreq,p) from application do
send a (IncPART,idreq,p) to supervisor ;
return ;
Upon receiving a (IncPART,idreq,p) message from pi do
partp++ ;
return ;
Upon GetAcc(idreq, p,acc) from application do
send (GetACC,idreq,p) message to supervisor ;
wait until receipt (ACC,idreq,p,value) from supervisor
accessp :=value ;acc :=value ;
return ;
Upon receiving a (GetACC,idreq,p) message from pi do
send (ACC,idreq,p,accesp) message to pi ;
return ;
Upon CompAcc(p,req,resp) from application do
if (resp 6= 0) then
accessp := al0 + (1− al0) respreq ;
else accessp := al0 +  ;
return ;
4) Cooperation Tracking Service: This service tracks
peer suspicion level. Peers feed this service by providing
it the outcome of their interactions with other peers of
the group.
This service exports the following methods :
tracking(in RESOURCE r,in PeerId s)
A constructor that instantiates the module.
IndStatus(in INT #,in PeerId p, in Boolean status,in LONG prob)
The invoking peer indicates in status whether p has responded to
its request or not. The report is taken into account with probability
prob, which is the access level of the requesting peer.
UPCALL CompAl(in INT #,in PeerId p,in INT req,in INT resp)
Computation of the access level is possible
UPCALL Test(in PeerId p) ;
Peer p has to be tested
UPCALL EndTest(in PeerId p) ;
Test of peer p is over
Local variables :
supervisor - supervisor in charge of the tracking module update
resourceType - type of the resource associated to supervisor
members - list of the members sharing the same resourceType
suspicion - list containing the suspicion value of each p ∈ members
testedp - p’s structure with 3 fields : status, req and rsp
tested - list of testedp structure
Tracking : :Tracking(r,s,mb){
allocate memory for all the data structures ; Note that the status
of all the peers is initialized to TRUE. This implements
the initial test of newcomers
initialize supervisor, resourceType and members}
Upon IndStatus(idreq,p,status,prob) from application do
send a (TRACK,idreq,p,status,prob,tested) msg to supervisor ;
return ;
Upon receipt of (TRACK,idreq,p,status,prob) msg from the network
if (testedp.status = TRUE) then
testedp.req++ ;
if (status) then testedp.resp++ ;
if (testedp.req ≥ D) then
send a (ENDTEST,p) msg to all peers in D ;
invoke CompAl(p,testedp.req,testedp.resp) ;
reset testedp ;
if (status=TRUE) then
if (suspicionp > 0) then
suspicionp- - ;
else
if (suspicionp < susp_max) then
do (suspicionp++) with probability prob ;
if (suspicionp = susp_max ∧ ¬testedp.status) then
Select a set D of D peers in members such that these
peers have the lowest suspicion level ;
testedp.status:= TRUE ;
send a (REQTEST,p) message to each peer ∈ D ;
return ;
Upon receipt of a (REQTEST,p) from the supervisor ;
invoke Test(p) ;
return ;
Upon receipt of a (ENDTEST,p) from the supervisor ;
invoke EndTest(p) ;
return ;
VI. SIMULATIONS
We have run simulations over 1000 virtual peers.
The number of resources types, and thus, the number
of groups and supervisors are chosen randomly from a
Gaussian distribution with mean 100. Simulations have
been ran during 10000 units of time. Requests arrive
randomly following a Poisson distribution such that
every peer makes approximately 1 request per 10 units
of time.
Peers are classified in three categories according to
their type :
– obedient peers follow the prescribed protocol,
– free riders reject all incoming requests,
– adaptive peers adapt to the evolution of their
welfare.
To simulate the adaptive changes, we used the fol-
lowing learning algorithm : an adaptive peer has a set
of strategies {accept, reject} from which he chooses
randomly one, at each interaction. Then, after a fixed
number of interactions called stage, each strategy s,
generates a utility u(s) (see Equation 1). Then, at the
next stage, the probability of choosing a strategy s is
u(s)P
s
u(s) .
The ratio of obedient peers, free riders and adaptive
peers are, respectively, 0.5, 0.1 and 0.4.
Figure 4 studies the behavior of different peers face
to the fair cooperation incentive mechanism. The ac-
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Fig. 4: Access Level Differentiation Mechanism.
cess level of the obedient peers converge quickly to 1,
while the access level of free riders drops to 0. This
highlights the two first properties of the mechanism (see
Section IV). Furthermore, the access level of the adaptive
peers significantly change and converge to the obedient
ones after having decreased during a short period. In
fact, the decreasing phase corresponds to the detection of
the bad behaviours and the increasing phase shows that
adaptive peers has changed their strategy to cooperation.
Figure 5 shows the variance of the participation level
of peers with the fair cooperation incentive mechanism.
This shows that the difference between the participation
level of peers and the mean overall participation very
quickly converge to nearly 0. That is, peers are almost
equally solicited. This corroborates the fairness property
of the mechanism, described in Section IV.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this work we have presented an incentive me-
chanism for Fair Resource Sharing. Our mechanism
is composed of a novel incentive, fair cooperation,
and an algorithmic part encapsulated in a middleware
layer. Moreover, we have proposed an architecture for
the middleware layer of our mechanism that brings
together several research areas (aggregation, semantic
group membership, and tracking) and have implemented
it using peer-to-peer techniques. We have proven the
efficiency of our mechanism through simulations.
In our near future work we are interested in formally
analyzing our fair cooperation mechanism as well as
extending the simulation work to measuring the trade-
off between fairness in the load balancing and efficient
request serving.
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